develop de novo, that is, almost entirely from scratch in a new environment. Two of the new nation's founding fathers advanced fundamentally different positions on the relationship between agriculture and manufacturing. 1 In the view of Benjamin Franklin the agricultural and nonagricultural sectors were clearly competitive, whereas in Alexander Hamilton's opinion, the two sectors were complementary. According to Hamilton's 1791 Report on Manufactures: "the aggregate prosperity of manufactures, and the aggregate prosperity of Agriculture are intimately connected." A prosperous agricultural sector encouraged manufacturing by supplying less expensive raw materials as well as food for workers and by providing larger markets for industrial products. Local manufacturing development in turn created a larger and more reliable market for agricultural products, one subject to fewer "injurious interruptions" to demand. The possible competition for labor was less problematic in Hamilton's view because manufacturing could employ women and children who were underutilized in farming and could attract new migrants from abroad.
Benjamin Franklin disagreed:
Manufactures are founded in poverty. It is the number of poor without land in a country, and who must work for others at low wages or starve, that enables undertakers to carry on a manufacture…. But no man, who can have a piece of land of his own, sufficient by his labor to subsist his family in plenty, is poor enough to be a manufacturer, and work for a master. Hence while there is land enough in America for our people, there can never be manufactures to any amount or value. that the share of income spent on food declines as income rises-then a revolution in agricultural productivity can free up resources, raise income and non-food demand, and thereby promote industrialization. 3 The relationships linking agriculture to other sectors have long been of interest to economists. 4 We draw on the work of two eminent agricultural economists, John W.
Mellor and Theodore W. Schultz, both of whom are "Hamiltonians" in that they see agricultural development as complementary to industrialization. Mellor and Schultz bring to bear a wealth of information from the less developed and developing countries of the past 60 years that provides a context for evaluating the nineteenth and early twentieth century European experience.
Mellor's Law
In 1966 Mellor posited that "the faster agriculture grows, the faster its relative size declines." 5 Others have dubbed this "Mellor's Law." Mellor's observation stems from the possibility that technological changes can overcome the effects of a growing population, and following Engel's Law, as per capita income increases, the percentage of income spent on food will decline leading to a relative decline in the size of the agricultural sector. Where agriculture represents a large share of total output, structural transformation requires increases in agricultural productivity. In the process, agriculture becomes relatively less important while paving the way for the development of the nonagricultural sector. Nearly 40 years later, leaders in the international development community still hold that this notion "captures the essence of agricultural growth and its causal relationship to the structural transformation and aggregate growth of an economy." country's percentage rate of growth of the total population. The y-axis shows the nonagricultural growth rate also divided by the growth rate of the total population. As the note on the figure makes clear, Mellor estimated OLS fits for two sets of countriesthe whole sample of 14 nations and a sub-sample omitting four outliers (Burma, Philippines, the Republic of Korea, and Singapore). The outliers are worth noting (beyond emphasizing the ad hoc analysis so common to comparative research).
Singapore is a city-state with almost no agricultural sector. 
Was an Agricultural Revolution Necessary?
As just noted, we realize that there are many conceptual problems and ambiguities with the Mellor framework. 9 To explore one such problem, we turn to an issue raised by Pedro Lains and Vicente Pinilla in their introduction to this volume. They delve into the relationships linking agricultural modernization and industrialization and note that, in the Rostowian framework, "an agrarian revolution was a prerequisite for the industrial revolution." 10 This view has been under scrutiny in the last decades. In fact, a revisionist literature has emerged questioning the contribution of the agrarian revolution to the industrialization of Great Britain and other European forerunners. Lains and Pinilla are raising the same issue that concerned Mellor and America's founding fathers-were advances in the agricultural sector a necessary precursor for more broadly based economic growth?
This is an issue that has long been debated and for good reason-the issue is both extremely important and decidedly more complicated than once thought. Posing functional relationships is relatively simple, but testing them in the context of varying institutional, cultural, and historical settings can be challenging. As we have noted, the importance of the task is amplified by the fact that in pre-modern times the agricultural sector, nearly everywhere, accounted for over 50 percent of employment and output and in some regions up to 90 percent of economic activity. Measuring the inputs and outputs of the agricultural sector and understanding the production processes, both within the sector and those linking the sector to the broader world, are crucial to our understanding of the role of agriculture in development. But in the pre-modern age the absence of data on even the most basic issues is a serious barrier.
The answer to the question, "can industrialization take place without an agricultural revolution" is Yes and No. The treatment of this issue has often suffered from a fallacy of composition. Someone, somewhere, needs to produce the food and fiber to feed and clothe the growing non-agricultural workforce-this is a necessary condition for industrialization. (It also helps to be able to transfer savings out of the agricultural sector, to earn foreign exchange via agricultural exports to help support industrialization, etc.) This implies that significant changes in agricultural production, and in the associated institutions and technologies that connect the agricultural and nonagricultural sectors, are necessary conditions for industrialization. However, these changes in the agricultural sector need not take place within each and every industrializing nation. 11 Just as every industrializing nation need not mine its own iron ore, every country does not need to harvest its own grain, produce its own beef, or grow its own cotton as long as there is international trade.
Thus, as we noted above, the answer to the question of whether an agricultural revolution is a necessary condition for industrialization is both yes and no. A nation's growing urban population must obtain supplies from someone, but not necessarily from its own countrymen. In this schema, the extent of agricultural development across nations will depend on a host of factors, including national comparative advantage, technological change in the transport sector, and the political economy and policies of individual nations. Just like no man is an island, few nations in the modernizing age ever truly divorced themselves from the international economy. One nation's opportunities and policies, for better or worse, affected and were in turn affected by, the changing international environment. 12 Exogenous changes (at least exogenous for many smaller nations) defined technological options, the cost and speed of transport, the access to markets, and much more. These considerations point to the need for comparative country studies, precisely of the type that Lains and Pinilla have encouraged in organizing this scholarly collaboration. In this regard Lains and Pinilla note: "The fact that we are putting the available quantitative information together will make it possible to answer relevant questions regarding the contribution of agriculture to economic growth since 1870." But take care. Our point is that it is not enough to simply study each country as a separate entity and sum up the component parts, because with international trade all sorts of efficiency enhancing substitutions, leading to different development paths, were possible. A finding that a specific industrializing country experienced little productivity growth in agriculture is not too meaningful when it had access to the bountiful surpluses of North America, Australia, Argentina, and Russia.
The Reasons for Agricultural Success and Failure
In the 1960s, Theodore W. Schultz was concerned with understanding the nuts and bolts of agricultural progress. 13 He argued that to a significant extent agricultural failure had much more to do with misguided government policies than to bad weather, irrational farmers, and the like.
To the minds of many who shape agricultural policy...farmers are ever so perverse. When a national economic plan calls for more agricultural production, farmers fail to respond; when instructions are issued to shift from wheat to corn, they fail to produce enough of either crop; when given the command to make a big leap forward, they step backward; and when they are heavily subsidized to reduce the acreage of particular crops, they proceed to increase the yield to produce more than offset the reduction in acreage. Farmers, especially in poor countries, are then looked on as loafers who prefer leisure to doing the extra work to increase production, as squanderers when it comes to savings for investment to increase agricultural production, and as ever so inefficient in using the resources at their disposal. Reapers, threshers, improved plows, tractors, drainage tiles, and pumps all were produced by industry. And, even the understanding of and the technologies developed for fighting crop and animal diseases and pests often depended on linkages to industry, the scientific community, and early government and private research and extension services. A comparative analysis of all of these issues, cataloging which policies were efficient and why, would be of great interest. In addition, we need a better accounting of the extent of the backward linkages that stimulated industrial output to deepen our understanding of the role of agriculture in the development process.
Caveat Emptor: Modeling Agricultural Growth
In this section we examine some of the models used to analyze economic and agricultural growth. We argue that recent advances in the "New Growth Theory" have great potential value for aiding our understanding of the place of agriculture in economic development, but its promise is currently limited by the failure to capture the diversity of It is not difficult to estimate the income of this farmer, for we know about how much land one farmer and his ox can care for, about how much can be grown on this land, about how much fruit the little orchard will yield, and how much the production would be worth at 1985 U. S. dollar prices. This income is about $2000. Moreover, we know that up until recent decades, almost all of the Korean workforce (way over 90 percent) was engaged in traditional agriculture, so this figure of $2000-$500 per capita for the farmer, his wife, and his two children-must be pretty close to the per capita income for the country as a whole. Though we do not have sophisticated national income and product accounts for Korea 100 years ago, we do not need them to arrive at fairly good estimates of the living standards that prevailed back then. Traditional agricultural societies are very like one another, all over the world and over time, and the standard of living they yield is not hard to estimate reliably. Indeed, my Korean farm scene…could be drawn from any century in this millennium or the last one. 16 For Lucas, a picture is worth far more than the proverbial thousand words-such is the power of theory! His notion appears to be that pre-modern agricultural societies were all in a steady state, undifferentiated, with zero per capita growth. Given that agricultural societies were all the same, searching for distinctive cross sectional differences between the agricultural sectors of various countries that might help explain different patterns of industrialization is folly. 17 Fundamentally, the world of Lucas is constructed on the Malthusian scaffold because the benefit of any technological change that might occur will simply be devoured by a larger population.
Most economic historians would recoil from the notion that all agricultural societies were basically the same at any point in time, let alone across the millennium (although the Malthusians among us would subscribe to the notion that incomes were more or less constant). 18 Nevertheless, any true insight as to the role of agriculture in development must take us beyond Lucas.
The New Growth literature is increasingly focusing on another relationship, longunderstood by economic historians, showing the inverse correlation between the share of the national labor force in agriculture and its level of per capita income. This pattern, documented for recent years in Figure 3 , strongly suggests that growth inherently involves structural change, specifically, a movement out of low-productivity agriculture into higher productivity sectors such as manufacturing and services. Studies of the contemporary cross-country growth experience, based on the Penn World data, confirm the standard Kuznets findings that labor productivity is higher outside than inside agriculture. 19 But the studies go two steps further, showing that (1) labor productivity inside agriculture varies much more across developed and developing economics than labor productivity outside agriculture, and (2) the gap between agricultural and nonagricultural productivity closes at higher incomes/lower shares of the labor force in agriculture. By the end of the nineteenth century, productivity in the two sectors in the United States was virtually equal. 
Induced Innovation
The induced innovation hypothesis is essentially a long-run version of the factor substitution argument that treats the evolution of technology and institutions as endogenous responses to the forces of factor supply and product demand. In terms of its simplicity, intuitive appeal, and number of adherents, it has no close competitor. The model is most closely associated with the works of Yujiro Hayami and Vernon W.
Ruttan. 22 They and numerous other adherents have claimed success in "testing" the model using national data from Europe. clearly lead to serious interpretative problems. 24 We have many other concerns with the application of the induced innovation model to the European case. The general tendency is to claim success when the model seems to fit, but when the data are at odds with the model's predictions, ad hoc reasoning is presented to make things fit. Giovanni Federico dismisses some of our concerns with the observation: "Indeed, a quick perusal of the country of origin of innovations confirms the basic insight of the model. All major mechanical innovations (the reaper, the tractor, the cotton and corn pickers, and so on) were invented or developed in the United States, while Europe led in the development of fertilizers and chemical products as well as in new practices of cultivation." 25 We take Federico at his word; he indeed made a "quick perusal." Even if he is correct that Europe on balance was more inclined to develop biological innovations and the United States (and the other land abundant nations) was more apt to create mechanical technologies, the number of exceptions on both sides of the Atlantic suggest that simple relative factor scarcities (or even changes in relative factor scarcities) do not explain the patterns of innovation. States, mechanization "was the principal, almost the exclusive, form of farm technological advance" between 1820 and 1920. 29 As noted above, our work on American wheat, cotton, and corn production indicates that this widely held view is simply wrong. To add to the wheat story, over the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries a succession of new varieties transformed the basic types of wheat grown in the United States which had an enormous impact on both labor and land productivity. 30 The European literature is far less tainted on this issue than American scholarship.
In particular J. L. van Zanden's classic on the "First European Green Revolution" offers a balanced assessment of mechanical and biological innovations (although a close reading suggests even he at times is misguided by the flawed logic of the induced innovation model). 31 The same process was underway in Europe with new wheat varieties being tailored for the harsher conditions found on the eastern steppes of Russia, for the more arid conditions in the Mediterranean, and the more frigid and shorter growing seasons of northern Europe. In the latter half of the nineteenth century major advances in wheat research conducted in nearly every European country enhanced production. Among the leading innovators were Henri Vilmorin (France), Wilhelm Rimpau (Germany), Rowland H. Biffen (UK), and Nazareno Strampelli and Francisco Todaro (Italy). Important wheat breeding programs were also underway in the Austro-Hungarian and Russian Empires.
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A truly sophisticated comparative history of the impact of biological innovations in Europe (and elsewhere) would be a major accomplishment. Such a work would have to consider the next issue we address.
Before and After vs. Cause and Effect
One spin-off of our work on the biological sources of productivity growth deserves special mention. To illustrate this, it is useful to return to our discussion of wheat. It is well known that yields per acre for wheat and other major crops in the United
States remained roughly constant before the 1930s or 1940s and only increased with the advent of hybrid seeds and new chemical fertilizers. This finding serves to highlight an important distinction between measuring the agricultural and nonagricultural sectors. In most areas of economic activity technological solutions last forever. A new idea, method, or type of machinery only becomes obsolete when it is replaced through the competitive process by an even more productive innovation. But the old idea is neither destroyed nor lost; it is just no longer efficient. In many instances the new build on the old, giving rise to the cumulative nature of technological development. In addition, for most sectors, innovations tend to be highly portable-an idea or a machine developed in one country is apt to work equally well in a wide variety of environments. Agriculture is uniquely different. Human intervention into biological processes predictably produces natural reactions in the form of pests and pathogens that inevitably erode the innate productivity of past innovations. Farmers have long understood the Red Queen's dictum: they have to run fast just to stay in one spot.
Moreover, unlike many mechanical or organizational innovations, biological technologies must be fine-tuned and harmonized to the specific climatic and soil conditions of a given locale, and maybe even a given plot of land. These insights are extremely important for the study of both European and American agricultural history given that a primary challenge for farmers in the nineteenth century was to enter into an increasingly globally integrated market where the prospect for the transmission of pests and pathogens was also increasing. Federico has touched on the Red Queen problem in the European context, but this issue still needs to be properly accounted for in the broader literature. 33 Doing so has the potential for changing many notions about the dynamics of medieval and modern European agriculture because, almost surely, the importance of biological innovations has been vastly understated.
Threshold Models
While evolved into an "historical fact" that had broad implications. 35 The reality was that in the early decades of diffusion, joint ownership, sharing, and custom operations were the rule rather than the exception. In the case of the reaper, over 50 percent of all machines in some areas were used on more than one farm, and many were used on five or more farms in a given year. The implications of this and related findings suggest that, at least in the historical periods we are looking at, we must reconsider studies that treat individual farms as discrete, independent, self-contained units of analysis. Van Zanden's treatment of mechanization illustrates our general point. In his introductory remarks he notes: "As costly machines could only be purchased by rich farmers, and as the use of them would have sharply increased the attractions large-scale production, a rapid mechanization of the production process would have given large farmers important cost advantages over We have a number of other criticisms of how threshold models have been used.
Scholars looking at the displacement of horses by tractors in the United States and
Europe have long been baffled because they found very little cost difference between the two modes of production over a period of several decades. 37 Our work suggests that the coexistence of the two modes was in large part a result of the fact that many of the key variables in the tractor adoption decision were endogenous. The old technique was embodied in the horse, a durable capital good with an inelastic short-run supply and a price that could adjust to keep the animal mode competitive. As an example, the real price of mature horses (age 2 and over) declined by over one-half during the first wave of tractor diffusion between 1915 and 1925. Besides lowering horse prices through direct competition, advances in the mechanical technology increased agricultural productivity and shifted out the supply of agricultural goods. Given a downward sloping demand for agricultural products, this led to lower crop prices and reduced the major expense of the animal mode: feed. Thus, via its effects on both horse and feed prices, the tractor by its very nature made its major rival more competitive.
Rather than reflecting long-run conditions, the co-existence of tractors and horses may merely have represented a transitional phase in the adjustment process. As in the debate over the profitability and viability of American slavery, the real question answered by such static microeconomic comparisons is whether the market for durable capital goods (here, the horse) was working properly. Apparently, it was.
Conclusion
We have drawn on the works of a number of agricultural economists with the goal of illuminating historical studies. Many of the issues that concerned Mellor, Schultz,
Hayami, and Ruttan have close parallels in the economic history literature. This should come as no surprise because the fundamental problem of economic modernization is a process that has been underway for centuries and is still far from complete. Perhaps by linking up with a literature studying a different set of countries and using different databases will provide insights and a firmer foundation for comparative analysis.
There are a number of issues that deserve more attention. As an example, more work needs to explore how links between the inventors-manufacturers and the adopters More generally, we would like to comment on the interplay of data and institutions on the one hand, and theory on the other. It goes without saying that economic theory is essential for our understanding of both contemporary and historical problems. But, in the case of the induced innovation and threshold literatures, some of the underlying assumptions took on a life of their own thereby creating research blinders.
Assumptions made for simplifying purposes, along with preconceptions and tentative conclusions have been repeated enough to miraculously be metamorphosed into rocksolid "historical facts," often with little or no regard for the actual data. In the case of the threshold literature, this led a generation of economists to define rural America in terms that were at odds with the data and that defied simple economic intuition about the persuasiveness of markets and the flexibility of production relationships.
Excessive commitment to the threshold model also led scholars to focus on a subset of questions, often ignoring more interesting and more fundamental issues that did not lend themselves to analysis with that model. This is particularly true of the work of economic historians dealing with the tractor, where almost all the emphasis was devoted to trying to explain the pattern of diffusion and virtually no attention was given to the tractor's enormous impact on the economy. 38 In a similar fashion, for almost 30 years agricultural economists, relying on the induced innovation literature, had many of the stylized facts of America's past wrong-often 180 degrees out of phase. Perhaps fresh investigations of other national experiences will raise similar concerns. We hope that our perspectives on the induced innovation hypothesis and threshold models will stimulate new research that will both help refine the models and illuminate the dynamics of technological change. We further hope that our findings might allow others to avoid some of the errors that befell a large body of the American literature. 6 Mellor also addresses the issue raised earlier of whether the agricultural sector competes with the industrial sector by drawing away resources that might promote industrialization. We have not presented Mellor's results for Africa and Latin America. Neither region exhibited a close relationship between agricultural growth per capita and nonagricultural growth. This is not to say that agricultural growth was not a stimulant to general development, only that the situation is less clear due to a complex array of differing policy regimes and external shocks that have masked the relationships. 
